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Introduction
Neoclassical money demand functions underlie much theoretical and empirical work. Typically the nominal interest rate is the price of money and the income velocity of money moves in conjunction with this rate. This is as in Friedman's (1956) restatement of money demand theory, although it contrasts with the institutionally …xed velocity in Fisher's (1911) quantity theory. Similarly to Fisher, velocity has often been assumed to be exogenous (Lucas, 1980 , Ireland, 1996 , Alvarez et al., 2001 . Similarly to Friedman, others have endeavored to explain velocity and related phenomena within the model (Hodrick et al., 1991; Eckstein and Leiderman, 1992; Ireland, 1995; Lucas, 2000; Kejak, 2004, 2005) .
Empirical work on money demand has focused on interest rate explanations as in the constant semi-interest elasticity model of Cagan (1956) (Eckstein and Leiderman, 1992, Mark and Sul, 2003) or the constant interest elasticity model of Baumol (1952) (Ho¤man and Rasche, 1991; Ho¤man et al, 1995; Lucas, 2000) .
Apparent instability in empirical money demand functions was found due to "shifts" in demand in the 1980s; for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992) found a break in cointegration around 1980. This instability literature was met with an e¤ort to include, within the money demand function, the prices of substitutes for money that may have been subject to large changes and that may have caused money demand without these substitute prices to appear unstable. In particular, interest earning accounts with demand deposits that could be used in exchange, or "exchange credit", were used to avoid the high in ‡ation tax of the 1980s and seemed to cause a shift in money demand. Including proxies for …nancial service innovation led to renewed results of stable money demand functions, even including the period of the big …nancial deregulations (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, Gillman et al., 1997; Gillman and Otto, 2003) .
Money demand has become less visible in the policy debate because of interest in Taylor (1999) -type rules. The focus on nominal interest rate instruments has bred the perception of policy irrelevance of money demand theory and the use of 1 monetary aggregates. However, McCallum (1999) has disputed such conclusions by emphasizing that money demand and the use of rules based partly on money aggregates are being disregarded to the detriment of the ultimate monetary policy results. Alvarez et al. (2001) further advance the importance of money aggregates by providing a general equilibrium basis for the equivalence between interest rate rules and money supply rules. Similarly, Schabert (2004) establishes a liquidity e¤ect in a general equilibrium neoclassical monetary model, in which there is also a direct relation between the money supply growth rate and the nominal interest rate. And empirical money demand work has recently become more prominent in the central banks of developed nations (for example, the euro-area studies of Brand and Cassola, 2004; Brand et al., 2002; Kontolemis, 2002) .
Developing nations tend to rely more on discretion rather than rules and often justify this just as central banks in developed nations did in the past: the money demand function is unstable. This sort of discretion instead of rules can lead to an "in ‡ation bias" of the type described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . Empirically, evaluating the stability of money demand still remains a challenge in developing countries, because of a lack of con…dence in the data quality and because of the many major changes that continue to occur in such economies.
In this paper, the key extension to a standard money demand function results from an investigation of whether the Fisher equation of interest rates holds. 1 The myriad ways in which an unexpected acceleration or deceleration of the in ‡ation rate can a¤ect the real interest rate makes suspect the standard Fisher (1930) relation that underlies classical money demand functions. In those, changes in the in ‡ation rate are directly re ‡ected in the nominal interest rate. But if this is not true, which can be a likely scenario in a transition country, then the standard money demand function requires modi…cation from only including the nominal interest rate as the price of money.
With an extended money demand speci…cation, the paper shows that a stable money demand function can be found for Croatia despite tumultuous changes there over the transition period. This presents a good case study in that the …nding of a stable money demand may be surprising. Both the emphasis of the Croatian central bank on the exchange rate in its monetary policy and the high fraction of private foreign exchange use in the country have led to the expectation that Croatian money demand is unstable (see Kraft, 2003 The data begins only after the Croatian hyperin ‡ation of 1993, and near to the beginning of the issuing of the new Croatian currency, providing con…dence in the data. The data's stationarity and seasonal properties are tested carefully (Section 3). After …nding the Croatian income velocity of money non-stationary (Section 4.1), in contrast to Fisher's (1911) concept, the paper focuses on whether the Fisher (1930) equation of interest rates holds in Croatia. Researchers such as Baba et al. (1992) have included the in ‡ation rate as well as the nominal interest rate in the money demand function; this strategy is justi…ed here in that evidence suggests a failure of the long-run Fisher relation in which the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation rate move together and are interchangeable in the money demand function (Section 4.2). This extension of money demand to include the in ‡ation rate along with the nominal interest rate, and so capture deviations from the Fisher equation, constitutes the baseline model (Section 4.3). Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000) estimate Yugoslavian money demand using the exchange rate rather than the in ‡ation rate or the nominal interest rate. The idea is that exchange rates re ‡ect the in ‡ation rate changes, as in the uncovered interest rate parity concept (see for example Walsh, 2003 Between 1994 and 2001 the in ‡ation rate was fairly stable around 5%; it then moved downwards steadily towards very low levels by 2003; and it has remained in the 1.5% range. With such low rates, the Croatian National Bank has begun succeeding in its "primary objective to achieve and maintain price stability" (2001 National Bank Act). This low in ‡ation has been achieved while the Bank has been described as being engaged in "strict exchange rate targeting" (Billmeier and Bonato, 2004) . Or as Kraft (2003) 14). These di¤erent perspectives suggest that the exchange rate may have been an important instrument in the Bank's realization of its low in ‡ation goal.
An interesting banking aspect of the M1 aggregate can be seen in Figure 2 .
Currency constitutes the lion's share of M1; the demand deposit to currency ratio averages well below one. In comparison, for example, the US demand deposit to currency ratio has trended downwards steadily from 4 in 1959 to near 1 in 2002.
Low-or non-interest bearing demand deposits have been used signi…cantly less in Croatia than in the US.
Figure 2. Croatian Monetary Aggregates
Another banking feature is that there have been signi…cant foreign currency denominated deposits, now primarily in Euros. These deposits have accounted for some 75% of total new deposits (Kraft, 2003) . Kraft suggests that these holdings may imply a "lack of credible monetary policy", adding that Croatians Benk et al., 2004) . Such changes in …nancial sector productivity can be incorporated in money demand functions in order to stabilize an otherwise seemingly unstable money demand function, as Gillman and Otto (2003) show in time series estimations for the US and Australia. However, deregulation has been gradual in Croatia and inclusion of …nancial sector variables in the money demand function appears less necessary.
Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in the estimation are IFS time series with monthly frequency and seasonal adjustment: industrial production for the output variable, M1 money, consumer prices, a Croatian Kuna (HRK)-euro exchange rate, and the money market interest rate (Table 3. 
Seasonal unit root tests
To ensure that the use of seasonally adjusted data is appropriate, we …rst consider Figure 4 , which compares seasonally unadjusted series with seasonally adjusted series. Only modest di¤erences emerge. However, it is useful to test whether explicit modeling of seasonality is requisite. In particular, if the series are stochastic and there exist seasonal unit roots, then these unit roots would need to be adjusted for through seasonal di¤erencing (Davidson et al., 1978; Dickey et al., 1984; Beaulieu and Miron, 1993; Canova and Hansen, 1995) . The particular test used for seasonal unit roots is that of Hylleberg et al. (1990) as adapted to monthly data by Franses (1990) , based on the following OLS regression:
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The t-tests for the signi…cance of the coe¢ cients are given in Table 3 .1, which
can be compared to the critical values tabulated by Franses (1990) . The 1 coef…cients are below their 95% critical values indicating that a unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected at the zero frequency, using the standard Dickey-Fuller tests.
Yet the existence of seasonal unit roots is rejected for all i coe¢ cients. Note that seasonal dummies and a time trend are included in the test regressions. These results together indicate that there is a stochastic trend within the series and that seasonality is deterministic. This means that seasonality need not be modeled explicitly. Using seasonally adjusted data directly, without having to remove any seasonal unit roots, allows us to save degrees of freedom with a limited data set.
Unit root tests of seasonally adjusted series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests for the order of integration (Table   3. 3) do not reject the hypothesis that the tested series have a unit root and are thus I(1). The ADF tests were performed by considering all options regarding deterministic components (i.e., trend and constant) and in all cases the unit-root hypothesis could not be rejected. Additional ADF tests on …rst di¤erences …nd strong rejection of the unit-root null in all series. The in ‡ation rate series deserves careful consideration, in that evidence on the integration order of the in ‡ation rate tends to be mixed between unit root and stationarity …ndings (Culver and Papell, 1997; Benati and Kapetanios, 2003) .
Perron (1989)-type tests for structural breaks can indicate if an apparent unit root is break-adjusted stationary. While such an investigation is limited within the short time periods available for transition countries, the Croatian in ‡ation rate ( p t ) does not appear to be trending ( Figure 1 ). The visual impression is further con…rmed by the unit-root tests (Table 3) , which strongly reject the null up to the …fth lag in the ADF regression (as no lagged di¤erences are signi…cant, simple DF test su¢ ces; the t-DF value is -9.653, with (y t 1 ) = 0.026).
Econometric modelling 4.1. The Income Velocity of Money
The observed downward trend in velocity in Figure 3 may be deterministic or stochastic.
A stochastic trend can be tested for using an unrestricted VAR in levels. The resulting VECM system is given in equation (1) and the results are presented in Table 4 .1. The lag-length of the VAR was determined by sequential testing for the validity of the system's reduction, starting with 12 lags (i.e., one year of data) and reducing one lag at a time. The reduction from 12 to 11 lags was not rejected, while all further reductions were strongly rejected by the system reduction F -tests. 5 The asterisk implies an unrestricted coe¢ cient. The …ndings imply that t I(1) regardless of the presence of a deterministic trend in the cointegration space. That is, an apparently systematic decline in the money velocity is in fact stochastic and no …xed per annum percent decline or deterministic downward trend can be claimed. It follows that long-run stability of the money demand equation requires consideration of additional variables such as the interest, in ‡ation or exchange rates. where Wald 2 (2) = 548:32, which is highly signi…cant. Individually, only the money variable is signi…cant; in ‡ation is not. Similar results are obtained by estimating the distributed lag version of the Fisher equation (Sargent, 1973) , which is speci…ed as a special case of the "extended" equation, i.e., ln(r t ) = + P m i=1ṽ i ln(p t i ) + " t . Estimation of this equation produces insigni…cant coe¢ cients of in ‡ation at all lags (including up to 12 lags) and similarly insigni…cant long-run coe¢ cients (not shown). In addition, the residuals are non-stationary which con…rms the previous conclusion about the integration orders.
Alternatively, following Crowder and Ho¤man (1996) 
It can be shown that~ 1 is asymptotically normally distributed since ln(r t )
I (1) ) ln(r t ) I(0), while ln(p t ) I(0) ) 2 ln(p t ) I(0); this estimator uses only I(0) variables and the standard distribution theory applies. 11 Estimation produces the following results:
ln(r t ) = 3:56
8 A linear trend was included in the cointegrating space. 9 However Sargent's (1972) extension, that includes levels of money, will yield valid inference, given that money is I(1) and cointegrated with interest rates; hence the I(0) in ‡ation would enter merely as an additional stationary regressor. 10 We assume the variables are measured as deviations from the means. 11 To see that~ 1 is a consistent estimator of^ 1 , observe that 16 where R 2 = 0:018, = 0:190, and DW = 2:04. These results allow drawing correct statistical inference on the estimated coe¢ cients, and also the DurbinWatson statistic is indicative of no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. However, the standard error of the~ 1 coe¢ cient is 2.69, which gives a t-ratio of 1.33. The null hypothesis H 0 :~ 1 = 0 cannot be rejected. This result again implies that the Fisher equation does not hold in Croatia. Thus it may be that the in ‡ation rate enters the long-run money-demand relation as a separate variable along with the interest rate.
Money Demand Estimation
Following Baba et al. (1992) , the baseline real money demand, or (m p) t ; is speci…ed so as to include real income y t ; the nominal interest rate r t and the in ‡ation rate p t : Within a multivariate cointegration framework, the order of the estimated VECM needs to be properly speci…ed in terms of the lag-length selection before commencing with the cointegration analysis. Formal tests of system's reduction validity, progressively reducing the number of lags in the system, reject all reductions beyond VAR(12), making the model a VECM with z t = [ (m p) t ; y t ; 2 p t ; r t ], and using 12 lags. The four-variable system is speci…ed as
, and u t (û t û t 1 ). However, the^ 0 coe¢ cient from ln(r t ) =^ 0 +^ 1 ln(p t ) +û t , i.e., the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest, cannot be estimated. 
Estimation using the Johansen maximum likelihood technique indicates two stationary combinations among (real) money, output, the interest rate and in ‡ation rate variables (Table 5) . 12 In particular, the restricted estimation where the rank condition (r = 2) and weak exogeneity of in ‡ation were jointly imposed produced an LR 
Money Demand without the In ‡ation Rate
As part of the robustness check of the baseline model, the money demand is also estimated with the assumption that the Fisher equation holds and so the inclusion of the in ‡ation rate is not necessary. The estimation of the system without the in ‡ation rate term requires a three-variable VECM instead of the four-variable one for the baseline. Experiments here …nd three cointegrating vectors with two of the three eigenvalues signi…cant on the basis of both -max and -trace statistics (see Table 6 ). This suggests that the third vector is apparently non-stationary, or I (1), while the estimates of the cointegrating vectors and their adjustment coe¢ cients are similar in both models. The money demand cointegrating vector is (m t p t ) = 2:25y t 0:44r t 0:01t. Additional tests are made for the reduced rank r = 2 and (jointly) for the exclusion of the deterministic trend from the cointegrating space. The exclusion of the trend is strongly rejected by the LR test statistic: 2 (2) = 25:36. A signi…cant problem with the reduced rank model emerges from 1-step and breakpoint Chow tests. These tests are failed, which indicates a lack of parameter stability (or constancy) that may be causing instability of the entire system.
Money Demand with Exchange Rates
As another alternative that checks the robustness of the baseline speci…cation, we consider Petrovic and Mladenovic's (2000) model of money demand which includes exchange rates in lieu of a nominal interest rate or an in ‡ation rate. This approach is based on "dollarization" or "fear of ‡oating" arguments (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) , although note that Taylor (2001) is more circumspect about what role exchange rates might play during a in ‡ation-targeting regime. To test the exchange rate approach, money demand is re-estimated with the exchange rate (ex t ) replacing the in ‡ation rate; the nominal interest rate is kept in the system. The VECM system is then ẑ t = [ (m p) t ; y t ; ex t ; r t ] and the results of the cointegration tests are presented in Table 7 . They indicate as many as three cointegrating vectors. 
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The LR test for the imposed restrictions has a 2 (2) of 2.226 (p = 0:329), which does not reject the joint restriction that r = 2 and that the exchange rate is weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters. A notable di¤erence, however, is in the near-zero values for the adjustment parameters in the money-demand equation (-0.03 and -0.02) . Including the exchange rate in place of the in ‡ation rate causes the model to lose completely the fast short-run adjustment property of the baseline model. The adjustment would take place almost never, making the exchange rate model unable to explain a stable money demand in the face of shocks.
Conclusion
The paper presents a rigorous model of money demand for a EU accession country, Croatia, during its transition years. First it examines whether the classical Fisher equation of interest rates holds, whereby the nominal interest rate should move together with the in ‡ation rate. Transition/EU-accession countries such as Croatia are perhaps especially likely to be undergoing changes in in ‡ation rate policy that produce unexpected in ‡ation rates; this can lead to a failure of the nominal interest rate and the in ‡ation rate to move together. Finding no evidence in support of the Fisher interest equation for Croatia, using a battery of tests, the paper then speci…es the baseline model as a classical money demand function extended to include the in ‡ation rate. With vector error correction methods, a cointegrated money demand function results with both parameter stability and timely dynamic re-equilibration to shocks.
For robustness, the baseline model speci…cation is compared to likely alternative speci…cations. First examined is the baseline without the in ‡ation rate, this being the standard, classic, money demand function. This alternative exhibits parameter instability. Second, the exchange rate is substituted into the baseline model in place of the in ‡ation rate. This re ‡ects a theme of the transition money demand literature: that the exchange rate acts as the in ‡ation rate in the money demand function because the in ‡ation rate is fully "passed through" to exchange rate changes. This speci…cation shows long run cointegration, but no timely dynamic adjustment to shocks. The lack of short run adjustment makes it an inferior alternative. The robustness of the baseline model relative to the main alternatives allows for some con…dence in the results.
Interpretation requires caution because of the data limitations that characterize all transition country studies. Starting the data series for Croatia only in 1994 avoids a hyperin ‡ation that peeked at around a 1500% annual rate in 1993; after this a new currency was introduced. Given the data quali…cation, the results can be interpreted …rst as showing that a stable money demand exists despite a less than calm period economically and politically.
Second, the analysis suggests that a policy that causes gradual changes in the in ‡ation rate is unlikely to disrupt the baseline money demand function because it includes the in ‡ation rate as a variable. This means that a policy of maintaining a low in ‡ation rate, or even gradually reducing the in ‡ation rate if it were at a higher level as in Hungary, is not likely to induce an apparent instability in the estimated money demand function. In turn, the in ‡ation rate should be able to be more easily forecasted using variables that enter the money demand function.
Then the forecasts can be used by the central bank to continue to act to stabilize the in ‡ation rate, a type of self-reinforcing interaction of policy with the behavior of consumers.
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In contrast, a policy for example that targets the exchange rate without regard to the in ‡ation rate could induce unexpected jumps in the in ‡ation rate that cause apparent "shifts" in the money demand function. This can lead to the belief that money demand is unstable, and justify further discretion from the central bank to o¤set the apparently unstable money demand function. This circle of interaction between policy and the consumer is less appealing in that the ultimate policy would likely be less e¢ cacious, and could lead to an "in ‡ation bias". This is not to argue that exchange rate targeting is necessarily worse than in ‡ation rate targeting. It does suggest that the use of exchange rate instruments in Croatia may de facto be part of a policy of in ‡ation rate targeting.
Policy-consumer interaction is an important factor in the ultimate e¢ caciousness of policy, as emphasized by Lucas's (1976) "critique". The nature of such interaction in general is not regime or consumer-behavior dependent, given the usual assumption of rationality of the agents. The speci…cs of the policy "function" that incorporates the consumer behavioral reactions will certainly change with the particular policy employed. Some policies will be less wasteful of societal resources than others. Arguably, a stable money demand function combined with in ‡ation rate goals results in a rather e¢ cacious interaction. And it is of some interest to see such a stable money demand function arising in a dynamic economy like Croatia, that has an explicit price stability goal set out in its central bank act.
